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Abstract
The article discusses problems of enforceability of regulatory decisions issued 
by the Polish regulatory authority – the President of the Office of Electronic 
Communications (UKE) in the context of the protection of the rights of electronic 
undertakings. The author refers to the standards for implementing decisions 
and provisional protection developed in the law of the Council of Europe and 
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Community legislation, including Framework Directive 2002/21/EC. He also 
analyses Polish legal regulations which introduce European solutions, including 
regulations implementing Community framework for electronic communications, 
into the national legal order. Special attention is devoted to the competence 
of Polish administrative courts and the Court of Competition and Consumer 
Protection in suspending the enforcement of contested regulatory decisions. The 
author also points to significant gaps in existing national regulations and postulates 
the introduction of necessary legislative changes to better protect the rights of 
telecommunications undertakings. 
Classifications and key words: telecommunication law, national regulatory 
authorities; enforceability of regulatory decisions, provisional court protection 
I. Introduction
Enforceability of administrative decisions is among the principal issues of 
administrative law, since decisions serve administrative authorities as a tool 
for pursuing the tasks that are set for them by the legislator. It therefore 
becomes important in this context to ensure the enforcement of the orders 
and prohibitions contained in a decision1. This is particularly meaningful 
in the case of activities of regulatory bodies, including those in the area of 
electronic communications. Their aim is to evoke, in the social and economic 
reality, specific changes, new behaviours or circumstances that, without an 
intervention of this type would:
• not arise at all, 
• arise with a considerable delay, or 
• arise in a form that does not sufficiently take into account the demands 
of the market environment, including consumers2.
1 Cf. e.g. Z. Leoński, Egzekucja administracyjna świadczeń niepieniężnych, Warsaw 1968, 
pp. 5–8; E. Knosala, Problemy decyzji wykonawczych w administracji publicznej (szkic z nauki 
administracji) [in:] Administracja publiczna u progu XXI wieku. Prace dedykowane prof. zw. dr 
hab. Janowi Szreniawskiemu z okazji Jubileuszu 45-lecia pracy naukowej, Przemyśl 2000, pp. 
295–298.
2 On sectoral regulation, see in particular works by T. Skoczny: “Wspólnotowe prawo regulacji 
in statu nascendi” [in:] C. Mik (ed.), Prawo gospodarcze Wspólnoty Europejskiej na progu XXI 
wieku, Toruń 2002, pp. 231–247; “Stan i tendencje rozwoju prawa administracji regulacyjnej w 
Polsce” [in:] H. Bauer, P. Huber, Z. Niewiadomski (eds.), Ius Publicum Europeaum, Warszawa 
2003, pp. 115–164; “Ochrona konkurencji a prokonkurencyjna regulacja sektorowa” (2004) 3(5) 
Problemy Zarządzania 7–34. See also: I. Kawka, Telekomunikacyjne organy regulacyjne w Unii 
Europejskiej. Problematyka prawna, Zakamycze 2006, pp. 27–70; M. Szydło, Regulacja sektorów 
infrastrukturalnych jako rodzaj funkcji państwa wobec gospodarki, Warszawa 2005, pp. 89–182.
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Enforcement of an administrative decision (and, in broader terms, an 
administrative act) is deemed to mean “introducing such a condition in social 
reality, which is in compliance with the provisions of the administrative act”3. 
Hence, enforceability of a decision equals its capability to have effects in the 
legal and factual spheres of its addressee4. A distinction is made between 
substantive and formal enforceability. The former means enforceability with 
regard to the provisions of the decision that has been reached, that is, the 
actual possibility to exercise the rights or obligations contained therein. 
Such capability is an attribute, predominantly, of decisions that provide for 
rights and those imposing obligations. In contrast, negative decisions are not 
enforceable, as a rule. Formal enforceability, in turn, points to the moment 
from which the act may and should be enforced. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the formal enforceability of decisions 
taken by the Polish regulatory authority in matters of electronic communications 
– the President of the Office of Electronic Communications (UKE)5. The rules 
that govern this enforceability will be considered, including the appeal stage 
of the proceedings, emphasising, in particular, the requirements which follow 
in that regard from Community law. This will lead to formulating proposals 
de lege ferenda, which will improve the effectiveness of judicial review of 
regulatory administration in Poland. Seeking the right solutions, the standards 
and models applied in broadly understood European law will be referred to. 
II.  Standards of the Council of Europe 
concerning the enforceability of administrative decisions
1. Enforcement of a non-final decision
The problem of the enforceability of an administrative decision may occur 
as early as the point of taking the decision at first instance, regardless of 
the available means of appeal against it in the due administrative course of 
instance. The Council of Europe has not yet developed a comprehensive 
position on administrative appeals, including the effects of such appeals on 
3 J. Jendrośka, Zagadnienia prawne wykonania aktu administracyjnego, Wrocław 1963, 
p. 22.
4 T. Barnat, “Ostateczność i prawomocność decyzji administracyjnych a ich wykonalność” 
(1984) 9 Państwo i Prawo 81–82; L. Klat-Wertelecka, “Wykonanie aktu administracyjnego” [in:] J. 
Zimmermann (ed.), Koncepcja systemu prawa administracyjnego, Warszawa 2007, pp. 545-547.
5 Hereinafter: “President of UKE”.
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the enforceability of decisions6. A major step in this direction, however, is 
the report on the desirability of preparing a recommendation on administrative 
appeals, adopted in Strasbourg on 7 December 2007, by the Council of Europe’s 
Working Party of the Project Group on Administrative Law7. In support of 
the adoption of such a recommendation, the Working Party points to the 
existence of a broad consensus amongst the member states of the Council 
of Europe as to the general rules of the administrative appeal procedure. 
These include the need to ensure the effectiveness of an appeal. This means 
not only the necessity on the part of the appeal body to act swiftly but also, 
in certain cases at least, the necessity to suspend the implementation of the 
impugned decision. If the law of a particular member state does not provide 
for an automatic suspension of a decision when an administrative appeal was 
lodged, the possibility to obtain such a suspension should be created upon 
request from the appellant.
2. Suspension of implementation of a final decision
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms does not refer directly to the necessity of ensuring, 
in the legal systems of the signatory states, the possibility for courts of law 
to suspend the implementation of an administrative decision. Article 13 
of the Convention, which provides for the right to an effective remedy, 
stipulates only that “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in 
this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity”. In its judgment of 2001 in the Jabari case, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held, in particular, that the notion 
of effective remedy used in this provision includes, inter alia, the possibility of 
suspending the implementation of the decision impugned in a situation, where 
such implementation poses a realistic risk for the appellant to be subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (Prohibition of torture).8 
This issue was later developed by the ECHR in its judgment in the Čonka 
case.9 The Court held therein that “the notion of an effective remedy under 
6 Cf. A. Skóra, “Polska procedura administracyjna w świetle standardów europejskich” 
(1999) 1 Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 67–68.
7 CJ-DA-GT (2007) 9. The Report is available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/
legal_co-operation/administrative_law_and_justice/Texts_&_Documents/CJ-DA-GT%20_2007_
%209%20E.pdf. 
8 See ECHR judgment of 11 July 2000 in Case No. 40035/98, Jabari v. Turkey, para. 50.
9 See ECHR judgment of 5 February 2002 in Case No. 51564/99, Čonka v. Belgium.
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Article 13 requires that the remedy may prevent the execution of measures that 
are contrary to the Convention and whose effects are potentially irreversible 
[…]. Consequently, it is inconsistent with Article 13 for such measures to 
be executed before the national authorities have examined whether they are 
compatible with the Convention, although Contracting States are afforded 
some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligations 
under this provision” (Article 13(79)). In the Court’s opinion, even though 
the interested party can apply for staying the execution of the decision, a 
procedure where the court uses its discretion as to whether to apply such 
stay or not, does not meet the requirements of an effective remedy. It can 
be concluded that the Court opts for essentially automatic staying of the 
execution of the impugned decision in cases where a realistic risk exists that 
potentially irreversible consequences will occur, contrary to the provisions of 
the Convention10. 
The issue of suspending the execution of final decisions is dealt with in the 
Recommendation No. R (89) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on provisional court protection in administrative matters11. The recitals to this 
Recommendation point out that “immediate execution in full of administrative 
acts which have been challenged or are about to be challenged may, in certain 
circumstances, prejudice the interests of persons irreparably in a way which, 
for the sake of fairness, should be avoided as far as possible”. Thus, this 
Recommendation indicates the necessity to create, within the legal systems of 
each member state, a possibility for the applicant to request the court to take 
measures of provisional protection against the administrative act (Principle I). 
Such measures can include “suspending the execution of the administrative 
act, wholly or partially, ordering wholly or partially the restoration of the 
situation which existed at the time when the administrative act was taken or 
at any subsequent time, and imposing on the administration any appropriate 
obligation in accordance with the powers of the court” (Principle III). 
The possibility of requesting measures of provisional protection should be 
available where court proceedings have already been opened to review the 
10 “It is not possible to exclude the risk that in a system where stays of execution must be 
applied for and are discretionary they may be refused wrongly, in particular if it was subsequently 
to transpire that the court ruling on the merits has nonetheless to quash a deportation order 
for failure to comply with the Convention, for instance, if the applicant would be subjected to 
ill-treatment in the country of destination or be part of a collective expulsion. In such cases, 
the remedy exercised by the applicant would not be sufficiently effective for the purposes of 
Article 13.” (para. 82).
11 See also: J. Chlebny, “Europejskie standardy procedury administracyjnej i sądowo 
administracyjnej” [in:] Z. Kmieniak (ed.), Postępowanie administracyjnej w Europie, Zakamycze 
2006, pp. 22–23; Z. Kmieciak, “Ochrona tymczasowa w postępowaniu sądowoadministracyjnym” 
(2003) 5 Państwo i Prawo 20–22.
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act in question as well as in cases of urgency, even though the act concerned 
has not yet been challenged in court. It should also be available when an 
administrative complaint, the making of which does not have, in itself, any 
suspensive effect, has been lodged against the administrative act and has not 
yet been decided upon (Principle I). In accordance with this Recommendation, 
in deciding whether the applicant should be granted provisional protection, 
the court shall take account all relevant factors and interests (Principle II). 
For this reason, the role of the court is to balance the various interests which 
come into play in a given case, including the ones which are in support of 
executing the act. Provisional protection should be granted, in particular, if 
the execution of the administrative act is liable to cause severe damage, which 
could only be made good with difficulty. This would be the case where the 
setting aside of the challenged act could not lead to the reinstatement of the 
applicant’s prior legal status. The other situation where, in the light of this 
Recommendation, a suspension of the execution of an act is justified, is if 
there are, prima facie, serious legal grounds against the administrative act. 
This concerns serious defects which are identifiable as early as at the stage 
of the preliminary review of the case, and which will undoubtedly lead to the 
setting aside of the challenged act12. The Recommendation emphasises the 
necessity for the court to act speedily in cases of provisional protection. This 
may mean that an oral hearing can be dispensed with but the proceedings 
must remain adversarial (Principle IV). The proceedings should not only 
involve the applicant; a representative of the administrative authorities and 
interested third parties should also have the possibility of presenting their 
views. Although this Recommendation does not mention the necessity to 
provide a statement of reasons for the court’s judgment on the provisional 
measure, the Explanatory Memorandum seems nevertheless to support such a 
solution. The statement of reasons should then briefly but clearly substantiate 
the issuing of the provisional measure. As already mentioned, there may be 
circumstances in which the urgency of the case makes it impossible to organise 
an adversarial court hearing. If, however, the court decides to grant provisional 
protection without hearing the interested parties, it should examine the case 
again within a short time, in adversarial proceedings. The court may act here 
on an ex officio basis or at the wish of one of the interested persons who 
previously could not be heard by the court.
The creation of possibilities to apply provisional measures of protection 
by a court, which is examining the legality of an administrative act, is also 
a requirement set by Recommendation Rec(2004)20 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states on judicial review of administrative acts adopted 
12 See Explanatory memorandum attached to Recommendation No. R (89) 8.
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on 15 December 2004. The Explanatory memorandum attached to this 
Recommendation points out, as is the case in relation to Recommendation 
R (89) 8, that provisional measures may include, in particular, the full or 
partial suspension of the execution of the disputed administrative act. This 
is to enable the tribunal to re-establish the de facto and de jure situation, 
which would prevail in the absence of the administrative act, or to impose 
appropriate obligations on the administrative authorities (Paragraph 94 of the 
Explanatory Memorandum). 
III. Enforceability of decisions under Community law
The problem of enforceability of administrative decisions is also present 
in Community law. Particular attention should be drawn in this context to 
the activities of the European Commission. Amongst its various functions, 
this institution also have the competences of an administrative authority that 
determines, through its decisions, the rights and obligations of individually 
specified addressees (an example of such decisive power of the Commission 
may be the enforcement procedure of Community competition law). The 
procedure before the Commission is, by its nature, a single-instance one, 
and the binding character of its decisions follows directly from the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (Article 249 EC). The Treaty requires 
that such decisions be notified to their addressees, whereby the date of such 
notification is of principal importance for determining the moment upon which 
its addressee becomes bound by the decision. Indeed, the Treaty stipulates that 
the decision takes effect upon such notification (Article 254(3) EC) and hence, 
the addressee is obliged to implement it. 
The addressee of a decision may institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Article 230 
EC)13. In the case of individuals, such actions are heard and determined at first 
instance by the ECJ (Article 225(1) EC). However, in accordance with Article 
242 EC, actions brought before the ECJ shall not have suspensory effect. 
Hence, even though an action is brought, the decision in question continues to 
be binding upon, and should be fully implemented by, its addressee. It should 
be emphasised that Community law does not make any distinctions between 
decisions, for instance, in terms of their subject-matter. Bringing an action 
to court does not suspend the execution of the challenged decision, even for 
13 For more detail, see e.g.: A. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, Oxford 
2006, pp. 53–94, K. Lenaerts, D. Arts, I. Maselis, Procedual Law of the European Union, London 
2006, pp. 203–328.
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decisions which interfere particularly strongly with the sphere of rights and 
obligations of their addressees, such as, for instance, Commission decisions 
imposing financial penalties or imposing behavioural or structural remedies 
upon an undertaking that violates Community competition law. 
Article 242 EC, second sentence, authorises the competent Community 
court to suspend the application of the contested act. The decision in that 
regard is left to the discretion of the court (“if it considers …”), with the sole 
premise being the necessity to take such an action (“if … circumstances so 
require”). The application for suspension of the operation of a measure shall 
be admissible only if the applicant is challenging the measure in proceedings 
before the Court14. The application must be made by a separate document, 
filed together with, or immediately after the bringing of the action. For it to 
be dealt with urgently, it must not exceed 25 pages15. It must also state “the 
subject-matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency, 
and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima-facie case for which the 
interim measure is to be applied”16. The applications are adjudicated upon, 
usually, by the President of the ECJ or the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
and, exceptionally, by a judge appointed for this purpose17. Community law 
does not set a time limit during which the application for suspension of the 
application of a decision should be examined. 
The decision on an interim measure should contain a statement of reasons, 
and Community law indicates that the effect of such a decision is only temporary 
and does not affect the court’s decision as to the merits of the case (Article 39 
of the Statute of the ECJ)18. It needs to be emphasised that such a decision 
may be changed or reversed any time due to a change in circumstances. This 
means that the dismissal of an application for suspending the application of 
a decision does not preclude a repeated filing of a corresponding application 
by the party, as long as that party is capable of demonstrating, in the new 
proceedings, that new circumstances support the application of the interim 
measure (suspending the application of the decision). 
14 Procedural issues relating to the suspension of operation of the Community decisions 
are specified in detail in Article 83–90 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and 
Article 104–110 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
15 See Court of First Instance, Practice Directions to parties, OJ [2007] L 232/7, para. 
68-71.
16 Article 83(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Article 104(2) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
17 Article 39 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. The CFI appoints such a judge for 
a period of one year. See OJ [2008] C 171/31.
18 Article 83(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Article 104(1) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
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Having regard to the aforementioned procedural provisions applicable 
before Community courts as well as the case law of the ECJ and the CFI, 
three grounds should be mentioned that determine the possibility of applying 
an interim measure19:
• A demonstration, by the applicant, of the existence of pleas of fact and 
law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measures that are 
being applied for (fumus boni iuris). 
In the case of an action against a Commission decision, it should be 
demonstrated that the decision is, prima facie, in breach of Community 
law in a manner which will in the future result in its invalidation by a 
Community court. The CFI points out, however, that an application must 
not set out in full the text of the application in the main proceedings20. 
The literature on the subject emphasises that the premise of fumus boni 
iuris is gradually transformed into the premise of fumus non mali iuris21. 
Therefore, this is not the conviction that the main action will succeed, 
as much as the view that it is sufficiently justified. 
• A demonstration, by the applicant, of the urgency of the case, and hence 
that the applicant will suffer serious and irreparable damage if the court 
does not apply the interim measure. 
In such circumstances the damage would not be possible to repair 
even if the party obtains, in the future, a favourable judgment based 
on the merits of its case. It follows from the case law that the damage 
should be certain, or at least established with sufficient probability. The 
burden of proof in this regard rests fully on the applicant. The damage 
does not necessarily have to be financial in nature. On the contrary, only 
in exceptional cases can financial damage be considered to be irreparable 
or reparable only with difficulty. Indeed, such damage can, as a rule, be 
covered by future compensation. The occurrence of financial damage 
justifies, however, the application for an interim measure where, without 
that measure, the applicant would be in a position that could imperil 
its existence before the final judgment if the main action is taken22. In 
Community case law, a serious and irreversible change in the market 
share of the undertaking concerned, which would take place in the 
absence of the suspension of the application of the contested Community 
19 See K. Lenaerts, D. Arts, I. Maselis, Procedual Law…, p. 433–442; P.K. Rosiak, M. 
Szpunar, Postępowanie przed Trybunałem Sprawiedliwości i Sądem Pierwszej Instancji Wspólnot 
Europejskich. Aspekty praktyczne, Warszawa 2007, pp. 69–70.
20 See Court of First Instance, Practice Directions to parties, OJ [2007] L 232/7, para. 70.
21 K. Lenaerts, D. Arts, I. Maselis, Procedual Law…, pp. 434–435.
22 See e.g. order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-346/06 R IMS v 
Commission [2007] ECR II-1781, paras. 121–123, and the case-law cited.
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act, is treated equally to the disappearance from the market. As noted by 
the President of the CFI, in the order in Case T-326/07 R, Cheminova, 
“it is therefore not sufficient that a market share, however minimal, 
may be irremediably lost; on the contrary it is necessary for that market 
share to be sufficiently large. An applicant who invokes the loss of such a 
market share must demonstrate, furthermore, that regaining a significant 
proportion of it, in particular by appropriate publicity measures, is 
impossible by reason of obstacles of a structural or legal nature”23.
• The application of the measure is supported by the result of balancing 
the various interests that come into play, that is, the interests of the 
parties and the general interest. 
This provides an opportunity for the judge to take account the broader 
context of the case. It may happen that a particularly serious general 
interest or the interest of third parties support the refusal to allow the 
application, even if the other two premises for suspending the application 
of the decision are fulfilled in the case in question24. 
An appeal against a decision of the CFI concerning an interim measure can 
be lodged with the ECJ within two weeks of the notification of the first-instance 
decision. The right to file an appeal concerning interim measures is also held 
by the other parties within the time limit of two months (Article 57 of the 
Statute of the ECJ). The appeal is heard by way of a summary procedure 
(Article 39 of the Statute of the ECJ). It has no suspensory effect (Article 60 
of the Statute of the ECJ).
In 2007, the CFI heard 41 cases for the application of interim measures; 
only in 4 cases were the applications granted25. 
IV.  Enforceability of decisions of national regulatory authorities
in the light of the provisions of Framework Directive 2002/21/WE
The principal act of the new Community regulatory order in the field 
of electronic communications is the Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory 
23 Order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-326/07 R Cheminova and 
Others v Commission [2007] ECR II-4877, para. 100, and the case-law cited.
24 See e.g. Order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-12/93 R CCE 
Vittel and CE Pierval v Commission, [1993] ECR II-785, para. 20; the order of the President 
of the Court of First Instance of 18 March 2008 in Case T-411/07 R, Aer Lingus Group Ltd. v 
Commission. 
25 See Court of Justice, Annual Report 2007, Luxembourg 2008, p. 184.
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framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework 
Directive)26. The Framework Directive transfers the solutions that function 
with regard to the enforceability of decisions of Community institutions into 
the electronic communications law in EU member states. Article 4(1) of the 
Framework Directive, which provides for the right of appeal, stipulates in its 
final sentence that “pending the outcome of any such appeal, the decision of 
the national regulatory authority shall stand, unless the appeal body decides 
otherwise”. The expression that the decision ‘shall stand’ should be understood 
to refer to its enforceability, its addressees being bound by the provisions of 
the decision made by the national regulatory authority, and hence the necessity 
to enforce it27. A position to the contrary is presented in this context by 
M. Rogalski, who considers that Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive only 
provides for the finality of decisions taken by national regulatory authorities 
and not their immediate enforceability by virtue of law28. This position is 
not accurate. Leaving aside the incorrect identification of the finality of a 
decision with its effectiveness, the Prof. Rogalski’s interpretation of Article 
4(1) of the Framework Directive is, in fact, detached from the stipulations of 
the provision in question. If, as M. Rogalski wishes, the decision remaining in 
force were to mean its finality, the power of the appeal body would be hard 
to understand, which deprives a decision of this very attribute (i.e. finality), 
while the appeal procedure is still pending (“pending the outcome of any such 
appeal…”), that is, before the substantive examination of the claims made 
against the decision. In such a case, a subsequent judgment on the merits of 
the case concluding the appeal procedure would not, in fact, be necessary if 
the issue of finality of the contested decision were to be resolved at an earlier 
stage of the appeal procedure. 
It is worth noting that the Framework Directive does not specify the moment 
from which the addressee is bound by the decision of the regulatory authority. 
This Directive only mentions that the time continues until the appeal is 
heard. An absolute requirement to be bound by the decision of the national 
regulatory authority from the moment the decision is issued, or rather delivered 
to the party, does not therefore follow from the foregoing. Article 4(1) of the 
Framework Directive requires only that the decision has, as a rule, the legal 
26 OJ [2002] L 108/33. For more detail, see e.g. S. Piątek, Prawo telekomunikacyjne Wspólnoty 
Europejskiej, Warszawa 2003, p. 32–38; J. Kolasa, “Krajowe organy regulacyjne” [in:] W. Gromski, 
J. Kolasa, A. Kozłowski, K. Wójtowicz, Europejskie i polskie prawo telekomunikacyjne, Warszawa 
2004, pp. 234–247; I. Kawka, Telekomunikacyjne organy…, pp. 133–139.
27 See e.g. S. Piątek, “Prawo telekomunikacyjne w świetle dyrektyw o łączności elektronicznej” 
(2005) 3 Prawo i Ekonomia w Telekomunikacji 8.
28 M. Rogalski, Zmiany w prawie telekomunikacyjnym. Komentarz, Warszawa 2006, 
pp. 247-248.
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effects provided for therein, regardless of the appeal procedure pending with 
respect to it. The procedure referred to in this provision is a procedure before 
an appeal body independent of the parties involved (that is, independent from 
the appellant, the authority and other parties affected by the decision). This may 
be a court of law, even though this is not an absolute requirement in the light 
of Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive. The function of an independent 
appeal body may also be performed by quasi-judicial institutions of various 
types, as long as the national legislator is able to guarantee their independence, 
and if they are specialised enough and have the capacity to collect case-law 
experience (in its Article 4(1), the Framework Directive points to a body that 
“shall have the appropriate expertise available to it to enable it to carry out 
its functions”).29 Administrative bodies, even higher-tier ones, can hardly be 
referred to as independent of the regulatory authority. The “inter-dependence” 
and hierarchical relationships between them, as well as the fact that they both 
belong to administrative structures that usually report to the government, 
would not let any administrative body, regardless of where it is situated in the 
administrative structures of a member state, meet the criteria of an appeal body 
referred to in Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive30. The foregoing means 
that the enforceability of decisions of the national regulatory authority does not 
necessarily materialise at the stage of the administrative appeal, or quasi-appeal 
procedure31. As a result, if the national legislator provides, in the administrative 
course of instance, for the possibility of filing an appeal against a decision of 
the national regulatory authority to a higher level body, or an appeal to the 
authority, which issued the challenged decision, this Directive does not require 
that the challenged decision “shall stand” for the duration of such procedures. 
Hence, it is allowed for the appeals under administrative procedures provided 
for in national law, to have the suspensory effect, that is, for them to suspend 
the application of the contested decision. The “suspensory” effect of such an 
appeal is excluded only where a party can avail itself of the possibility of filing an 
appeal with an independent appeal body, which is, in practice, most frequently 
a court of law. It should be emphasised that the decision remaining in force 
during the appeal procedure, required under Article 4(1) of the Framework 
29 Cf. S. Piątek, Prawo telekomunikacyjne Wspólnoty…, p. 58; N.Th. Nikolinakos, EU 
Competition Law and Regulation in the Converging Telecommunications, Media and IT Sectors, 
Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp. 211–212.
30 Certain concerns in that regard were expressed by the European Commission in its report 
of 2003. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European 
Electronic Communications Regulation and markets 2003, Report on the Implementation of the 
EU Electronic Communications Regulatory Package, Brussels, 19.11.2003, COM(2003) 715 final, 
pp. 26–27.
31 Cf. S. Piątek, Prawo telekomunikacyjne w świetle…, p. 9.
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Directive, should have an ipso iure effect, and should not be made dependent 
on the activities of the regulatory authority.32 For due implementation of this 
Directive, it is thus not sufficient for the national regulatory authority to be 
competent to recognise the enforceability of the challenged decision and put 
it into force at the stage of the appeal procedure. Hence, the very possibility 
for this authority to make the contested decision enforceable immediately at 
this stage would not be an appropriate method for the performance of the 
implementation obligations of an EU member state.
It should also be emphasised that the principle of a decision of the national 
regulatory authority remaining in force for the duration of the appeal 
procedure, referred to in Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, is not 
absolute in its nature. The foregoing provision clearly points to the possibility 
for this principle to be overturned by a decision of the appeal body. It means 
that it is the obligation of the national legislator to create, for the appeal body, 
the possibility of temporarily (that is for the duration of the appeal procedure) 
suspending the application of the contested decision. The Community legislator 
thus puts the effective decision, concerning the enforceability of the decision 
of the national regulatory authority, in the hands of the appeal body, that is, 
in practice, a court of law. It then assumes that situations may occur in the 
application of national legislations that implement the package of Directives 
on electronic communications, whereby the independent appeal body should 
suspend the application of the contested decision, even though the decision is 
essentially enforceable by virtue of law itself. The Framework Directive does 
not specify what grounds should determine such suspension.
V. Enforceability of decisions by the President of UKE
1. Introductory remarks
The basic act of law, which implements the package of Community 
Directives on electronic communications in Poland, is the Act of 16 July 2004 
on Telecommunications Law (PT)33. However, issues of enforceability of 
the decisions taken by the President of UKE are also governed by the Code 
32 Such a position was taken by the Commission in the abovementioned Report on the 
Implementation of the EU Electronic Communications Regulatory Package of 2003 (p. 26). 
Differently: M. Rogalski, who considers that immediate enforceability should follow in this 
case from a decision by the national regulatory authority and not by virtue of law itself. See. 
M. Rogalski, Zmiany w prawie…, p. 250.
33 Dz.U. 2004, No. 171, item 1800, with further amendments.
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of Administrative Procedure (KPA) containing the principal set of rules on 
the proceedings before all public administration bodies in matters resolved 
through administrative decisions within their competence (Article 1 point 1 
KPA). From this point of view, the provision of Article 206(1) PT is of an 
organisational nature only and does not, in fact, introduce any new content34. 
It needs to be emphasized that the KPA applies to proceedings before the 
President of UKE directly and not, for instance, by analogy. It is clear at 
the same time that the provisions of the PT, which is a special statute, may 
introduce certain modifications with respect to the solutions contained in the 
Code. In such a case, the provisions of the PT should prevail, in line with 
the commonly adopted method of legal interpretation of lex specialis derogat 
legi generali. Due to the nature of the derogations introduced by the PT with 
respect to the KPA, special rules of this type may not be interpreted broadly 
and hence, where in doubt, a presumption should support the adoption of the 
concepts contained in the Code. 
Having regard to the issues relating to the enforceability of decisions taken 
by the President of UKE, it seems reasonable to divide them into two groups: 
decisions that may be appealed to an administrative court and decisions that 
may be appealed to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection 
(SOKiK). It is only in the latter case that the decisions are clearly enumerated 
in the PT. These are decisions on the designation of significant market power, 
the imposition of regulatory obligations, the imposition of penalties, and 
decisions issued in disputes (Article 206(2) PT)35. The foregoing means that 
decisions, which are not listed as appellable to the Court of Competition 
and Consumer Protection in the provisions of Article 206(2) PT, may be 
appealed, on general terms, to an administrative court36. This division is the 
more justifiable in that only with regard to decisions that can be appealed to 
the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (except for decisions on 
the imposition of penalties) that the legislator has decided that they shall be 
enforceable immediately (Article 206(2a) PT).
34 In accordance with this provision, “Proceedings before the President of UKE shall be 
governed by the Code of Administrative Procedure with the amendments hereunder”. See also: 
S. Piątek, Prawo telekomunikacyjne. Komentarz, Warszawa 2005, p. 1120.
35 Except for decisions on general exclusive frequency licences following a tender or a 
contest and decisions that deem the tender or a contest unresolved.
36 In accordance with Article 184 of the Polish Constitution and Article 3 of the Act of 
30 August 2002 – Law of Procedure before Administrative Courts (Journal of Laws 2002, 
No. 153, item 1270, with further amendments), in the Polish legal system, the presumption of 
competence of administrative courts applies in cases of review of administrative activities.
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2. Decisions which may be appealed to the administrative court
As regards this group of decisions of the President of UKE, in the absence 
of special rules, they are governed in full by the provisions of the KPA and 
the Act on the Law of Procedure before Administrative Courts (PPSA). This 
sets a clear situation whereby a party to the procedure has the right to file an 
application for re-examining the case (Article 127(3) KPA), with regard to a 
decision taken by the President of UKE, as the central authority of government 
administration whose process position, for the purposes of the administrative 
procedure, is made equal to that of a minister (Article 190(3) PT, Article 5(2) 
point 4 KPA). Such an application is not transferred the case to the superior 
authority and hence, the case is re-heard by the body that issued the decision 
being challenged in the application. Since the legislator requires that such an 
application be governed by the provisions on appeals against decisions, the 
decision shall not be enforceable before the expiry of the time limit for filing 
the said application (Article 130(1) KPA). Filing of the application within the 
time limit suspends its enforcement (Article 130(2) KPA). 
However, the principle of non-enforcement of a decision during the course 
of the proceedings opened upon an application for having the case heard again 
does not apply absolutely. Exceptions to this rule are provided for in Article 
130(3) and (4) KPA. Leaving aside the issue of immediate enforceability of a 
decision by virtue of law (which will be presented below), a particular place 
is occupied by the possibility of making the decision enforceable immediately 
following the procedure provided for under Article 108 KPA (Article 130(3) 
point 2 KPA). In accordance with this provision, the order of immediate 
enforceability may be given in four situations. Situations are included where 
it is necessary:
• to protect human health or life,
• to protect the national economy against heavy losses,
• to protect another social interest,
• to protect an exceptionally important interest of a party37. 
There is consensus in the doctrine and the case-law of administrative 
courts that the above grounds may not be interpreted broadly38. The notion 
of necessity seems to be of key importance in this regard. The possibility of 
37 In the latter case, the authority may demand the appropriate security from the party. 
38 See e.g. Z Janowicz, Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego. Komentarz, Warszawa 1996, 
p. 281; W. Chróścielewski [in:] W. Chróścielewski, J.P. Tarno, Postępowanie administracyjne. 
Zagadnienia podstawowe, Warszawa 2002, p. 124.; Cz. Martysz [in:] G. Łaszczyca, Cz. Martysz, 
A. Matan, Postępowanie administracyjne ogólne, Warszawa 2003, p. 676; J. Borkowski [in:] 
B. Adamiak, J. Borkowski, Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego. Komentarz, Warszawa 2005, 
p. 519.
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invoking, for instance, a social interest pursued by the decision in question 
is not sufficient. If the entire activities of state administration are aimed at 
pursuing this interest, its existence in a specific case does not distinguish it 
amongst other cases in a manner that would support the departure from 
the general rules of the procedure concerning the possibility to suspend the 
appeal and the application for re-examining the case concerned. The need 
to protect social interest should, therefore, be such that it requires, beyond 
any doubt, not only the decision itself to be issued, but also its immediate 
application. Consequently, social interest could suffer material damage if the 
decision was enforced only after it gets the status of an effective decision 
(Article 16(1) KPA). As the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) holds in 
its judgment of 19 February 1998, V SA 686/97, “[r]eferring to the notion of 
“necessity” for immediate action, the legislator finds that it may be the case, 
where, in the particular time and particular situation, it is not possible to do 
without the exercise of the rights and obligations that are established in the 
decision, because a delay endangers the protected values specified in Article 
108 § 1 KPA. Such a threat must be realistic rather than just probable, and 
the circumstance must be demonstrated in the statement of reasons for the 
order of immediate enforceability”39.
The PT specifies also the cases where a decision of the President of UKE 
can be made immediately enforceable. This applies to the decisions mentioned 
in Article 98(3)40, Article 178(1)41, Article 201(9)42, Article 202(2)43 and 
Article 203(1)44 PT. The PT stipulates that the decision concerned “shall be 
enforceable immediately”. The foregoing means that the said decisions are 
not enforceable immediately by virtue of law, in the meaning of Article 130(3) 
point 2 KPA. Instead, it is the authority that is obliged to provide the decision 
with the order of immediate enforceability. Thus, the foregoing provisions 
of the PT complement the grounds for making a decision enforceable 
immediately, as set out in Article 108(1) KPA. In contrast, however, to the 
aforementioned provision of the KPA, they do not offer the authority a choice 
of whether to attach an order of immediate enforceability. In each case of 
39 ONSA 1998, No 4, item 147.
40 Decision on the amount of the participation in financing the subsidy for a telecommuni-
cations undertaking.
41 Decision imposing certain obligations in the event of a particular threat.
42 Decision to prohibit the performance of telecommunications operations, modify or 
withdraw a general exclusive frequency licence or orbital resources licence, or a numbering 
assignment.
43 Decision to order the inspected entity to take steps aiming at eliminating the threat 
referred to in Article 202 para. 1 PT.
44 Decision to order discontinuation to use or operate radio equipment by unauthorised 
person. 
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issuing a decision based on the PT, the authority is, in fact, obliged to give it 
such an order. Essentially, the order of enforceability should be set out in the 
decision itself even though, if the authority does not do so for any reason, it 
should have the possibility to issue a decision on giving such an order at a later 
date. The legal basis for such a decision would be Article 108(2) KPA. Since 
the order of immediate enforceability is required to be given in such cases by 
PT itself, when hearing appeals the President of UKE could annul it only if 
the case concerned did not refer to one of the decisions specified in Article 
98(3), Article 178(1), Article 201(9), Article 202(2) or Article 203(1) PT. The 
party’s position to the effect that, for instance, the order is unnecessary to 
perform the obligations imposed in the situation concerned, or too onerous, 
or its consequences could only be alleviated with difficulty, etc., could not be 
accepted. 
The determination of the moment from which the order of immediate 
enforcement applies, remains controversial45. The literature on the subject 
refers in this regard to both the moment the decision or ruling referred to in 
Article 108(2) KPA46 is issued, and the moment it is delivered47. It seems that 
the latter is better supported by the provisions of the Code, since the legislator 
links the effect in the form of the authority being bound by the decision or 
the ruling issued with the moment of its delivery (Article 110 in conjunction 
with Article 126 KPA). Even if immediate enforcement of a decision upon 
its issuance, or upon the issuance of a ruling on giving the decision the order 
of immediate enforceability, were accepted (Article 108(2) KPA), this should 
not apply to decisions imposing obligations upon a party. Indeed, it would 
be contrary to the principles of the rule of law, including the principle of the 
citizen’s trust in state authorities, to impose obligations upon a party, which 
such party stands no chance to fulfil, if it has not been notified in the form 
provided by the law. 
The order of immediate enforceability given pursuant to Article 108 KPA 
expires upon the issue of the decision changing or annulling the prior decision 
(as a result of the filing of an application for re-examination of the case) by 
the President of UKE. The order of immediate enforceability provided for 
in the decision itself also expires upon the issue by the President of UKE of 
a decision annulling such an order. Where the order is given after the decision 
45 Doubts arise not only where a decision is pronounced orally (the order would then apply 
from such pronouncement). This form of communicating the decision to its addressee(s) is 
exceptional though (cf. Article 14 and Article 109 KPA) and is of no major importance in 
practice. 
46 A. Wróbel [in:] M. Jaśkowska, A. Wróbel, Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego. 
Komentarz, Zakamycze 2005, p. 677.
47 Cz. Martysz [in:] Postępowanie administracyjne…, p. 678. 
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is issued, in a separate ruling (Article 108(2) KPA), subsequently challenged 
in an application for re-examining the case, the order loses effect upon the 
issuance by the President of UKE of a ruling that annuls the ruling on making 
the decision enforceable immediately. 
With respect to this group of decisions by the President of UKE, a party 
has the possibility of opening the procedure for review of their legality by 
administrative courts (Regional Administrative Court (Wojewódzki Sąd 
Administracyjny, WSA) in Warsaw and, further, the Supreme Administrative 
Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, NSA). 
The filing of an appeal with the WSA does not have an automatic suspensory 
effect48. This is indicated in the provisions of Article 61(1) PPSA, under which 
the filing of an appeal does not suspend the enforcement of the contested act 
or activity. Therefore, the decision can be enforced. A party has, however, 
the right to apply in the first place to the authority that issued the decision 
(in this case the President of UKE), and, as a next step, to the court, to 
suspend the enforcement of the contested decision. As pointed out in by the 
doctrine, the provisions of the PPSA concerning these issues are designed with 
reference to the rules of the aforementioned Recommendation No. R (89) 8 
of the Committee of Ministers49. Both the literature on the subject and the 
case law of the NSA present a view pointing to the necessity to observe “far-
reaching prudence” in the enforcement of effective decisions before the 
expiry of the time limit for appealing against them, due to the risk of the 
occurrence of irremediable consequences50. What is meant here is to keep the 
necessary compromise between the effectiveness of administrative acts and the 
effectiveness of their review as exercised by administrative courts. 
The PPSA does not set out positive grounds that could support the 
suspension of the enforcement of decisions taken by the administrative 
authority. Article 61(2) point 1 PPSA specifies only the negative grounds, 
the occurrence of which excludes the possibility of suspending enforcement. 
Therefore the authority may suspend the enforcement of the decision unless 
there are grounds which in administrative proceedings makes the decision 
48 For more detail, see: R. Sawuła, “Suspensywność skargi sądowo administracyjnej” (2000) 
1–2 Samorząd Terytorialny 197–206.
49 W. Chróścielewski, Z. Kmieciak, J.P. Tarno, “Reforma sądownictwa administracyjnego 
a standardy ochrony praw jednostki” (2002) 12 Państwo i Prawo 39.
50 NSA judgment of 21 August 1981, II SA 108/81 (1983) 1 Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 
item 19; J. Borkowski, “Wstrzymanie wykonania aktu zaskarżonego do Naczelnego Sądu 
Administracyjnego” [in:] Instytucje współczesnego prawa administracyjnego. Księga jubileuszowa 
Profesora zw. dra hab. Józefa Filipka, ed. I. Skrzydło-Niżnik, P. Dobosz, D. Dąbek, M. Smaga, 
Kraków 2001, pp. 70–71; T. Woś [in:] Postępowanie sądowoadministracyjne, ed. T. Woś, Warszawa 
2004, p. 217; same [in:] Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi. Komentarz, ed. 
T. Woś, Warszawa 2005, p. 294.
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or order immediately enforceable or where specific statute excludes staying 
of their enforceability. This solution is criticised in the legal literature as 
excessively restrictive from the viewpoint of the authority. T. Woś assumes in 
this context that, when refusing to suspend the enforcement of a decision, the 
authority has to demonstrate that one of the grounds for making the decision 
enforceable immediately has been fulfilled (Article 108(1) KPA). Then, in 
practice, it will be rare for the authority to deny enforcement51. These concerns 
do not seem to be fully justified. Indeed, even where the grounds contained 
in Article 108(1) KPA do not hold, the authority is not obliged to suspend the 
enforcement of the decision but can only use this possibility. Indeed, if the rule 
is the absence of a suspensory effect of an appeal filed with the administrative 
court, suspending the enforcement of the contested decision should always be 
regarded as an exception, rather than be commonly applied.
The authority decides on an application for suspension in a ruling. Even 
though such a ruling is unappealable, it may, as a next step, be changed or 
annulled by the court of law (Article 61(4) PPSA). Refusal on the part of 
the authority to suspend the enforcement of a decision or a ruling does not 
deprive the applicant of the right to file a corresponding application with the 
court. 
Suspending the enforcement of a decision by the authority pursuant to 
Article 61(2) point 1 PPSA should not apply at all with respect to the decisions 
specified in Article 98(3), Article 178(1), Article 201(9), Article 202(2) and 
Article 203(1) PT. As far as these decisions are concerned, “grounds hold 
which condition, in administrative proceedings, the making of a decision […] 
enforceable immediately” in the meaning of Article 61(2) point 1 PPSA. 
If, as already demonstrated, the legislator requires that the authority gives 
these decisions the order of immediate enforcement, it is hard to conclude 
that the same authority could subsequently waive that order. Such competence 
should be vested solely with the administrative court.
A view is expressed in the legal literature that due to the wording of Article 
4(1) of the Framework Directive, the possibility to suspend the enforcement 
of a decision of the President of UKE should be excluded after an appeal 
is filed with the administrative court52. This opinion should be considered 
correct with regard to the decisions taken by the President of UKE, which 
are based on the rules of Polish law implementing the provisions of the 
electronic communications package of 2002. Even though Article 4(1) of the 
Framework Directive refers to the possibility of suspending the enforcement of 
decisions of the national regulatory authority, this competence is, nevertheless, 
51 T. Woś [in:] Postępowanie sądowo administracyjne…, s. 220; same [in:] Prawo o postę-
powaniu…, p. 298.
52 S. Piątek, Prawo telekomunikacyjne w świetle…, p. 9.
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reserved for the appeal body and not the authority itself. This indicates the 
necessity to provide in the PT for a clear exemption from Article 61(2) point 
1 PPSA. Having regard to the principle of superiority and the principle of 
direct applicability of Community law, it should be concluded that even in the 
absence of a clear national rule, the President of UKE is obliged to refuse to 
suspend the enforcement of any decision that is challenged in the court and 
that pursues, in the case concerned, the objectives of Community electronic 
communications Directives. In any event, the competence concerning the 
suspension of a contested decision expires once the appeal is passed on to 
the administrative court. From that moment on, it is only the court that can 
decide on the suspension of the enforcement of the decision or ruling (in part 
or in whole) (Article 61(3) PPSA). 
A view has been established in the case law of the administrative courts 
that “the analysis of the grounds for providing the appellant with provisional 
protection leads to the conclusion that the principal objective behind 
the procedure is, above all, to ensure maximum judicial effectiveness of 
administrative review, through the creation of conditions warranting effective 
enforcement of a court judgment… This objective, which is fundamental 
for the exercise of justice, and which is pursued by administrative courts, 
converges with the interest of the appellant: to keep the status quo until the 
case is heard by the court. From this point of view, provisional protection is 
an extremely important procedural guarantee of the party’s right because, in a 
considerable proportion of cases, it is the only way to protect the party against 
the consequences of defective acts and activities of public administration 
bodies”53. 
An application for suspending a contested decision, filed with the 
administrative court, may be accompanied by an appeal, or may follow at a 
later date. Unlike in proceedings before an administrative authority, the PPSA 
sets out the positive grounds for suspending the enforcement of a decision, 
or a ruling, by the administrative court. This is a situation “where there is a 
risk of causing material damage or consequences that are difficult to repair”. 
The list of these grounds is exhaustive. It makes reference to future events 
that can, however, be anticipated on the basis of a reasonable assessment of 
the situation, as a consequence of the issuance of the decision54. The case law 
of the NSA assumes that it is a damage (financial as well as non-financial), 
which cannot be compensated by a subsequent return of a performance or the 
53 NSA resolution of 16 April 2007, I GPS 1/07, (2007) 4 Orzecznictwo Naczelnego Sądu 
Administracyjnego i Wojewódzkich Sądów Administracyjnych, item 77. See also the comment to 
the resolution by R. Sawuła, in: (2008) 1–2 Samorząd Terytorialny 162–166. 
54 J. Borkowski, “Wstrzymanie wykonania decyzji w postępowaniu kasacyjnym” (2005) 14 
Monitor Prawniczy 677.
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situation when it is not possible to restore original position. This is the case 
where there is a risk of losing the subject of the performance that, due to its 
properties, cannot be replaced with any other item, and its pecuniary value 
would be insignificant for the complaining party, or where there is a risk of 
loss of life or damage to health55.
In its aforementioned resolution of 16 April 2007, I GPS 1/07, the NSA 
held that the legislator does not co-relate, even in the smallest degree, the 
grounds for granting of provisional protection with the likelihood/probability 
of the appeal against the decision being, eventually, succeeded. Hearing the 
application for the suspension of the enforcement of a decision, the court 
cannot thus consider, even preliminarily, whether the decision is defective in 
any way. 
The court cannot suspend the enforcement of the challenged acts where 
“the special statute excludes the suspension of their performance” (Article 
61(3) PPSA). It should be concluded that both, in the procedure before the 
authority and in the administrative court, this ground should be understood 
narrowly. This is a situation where the legislator clearly excludes the possibility 
of suspending the enforcement of certain decisions or rulings by the court. As 
a result, such an exclusion may not be implicit, as it constitutes an exception 
to the principle of effective judicial review of administrative acts. It is worth 
noting that the PT does not provide for the exclusion of the possibility of 
suspending the enforcement of a decision by the regulatory authority. 
A court ruling on suspending the enforcement of a challenged decision 
does not bear the attribute of permanence, as it can be changed or annulled 
at any time ’where circumstances change’ (this also applies to final rulings)56. 
The foregoing means that the complaining party may re-submit its application 
for suspension, even if it was rejected previously, provided that the party 
demonstrates that the change in circumstances justifies a change in the court’s 
position concerning the suspension of enforcement of the challenged decision 
or ruling. 
A complaint can be filed with the NSA against the ruling of the regional 
administrative court concerning the suspension, or refusal to suspend, of 
the enforcement of a decision or ruling (Article 194(1) point 2 PPSA). The 
foregoing means that the ruling of the regional administrative court concerning 
suspension is not final, until the expiry of the time limit for filing the appeal, 
or until the NSA dismisses the complaint (Article 168(1) PPSA). This brings 
about uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the complainant, and 
55 NSA ruling of 20 December 2004, GZ 138/04, unpublished. See also B. Dauter [in:] 
B. Dauter, B. Gruszczyński, A. Kabat, M. Niezgódka-Medek, Prawo o postępowaniu przed 
sądami administracyjnymi. Komentarz, Zakamycze 2006, pp. 161–163.
56 The ruling may be issued on an in-camera session (Article 61 § 5 PPSA).
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is contrary to the requirement of speediness of court decisions on interim 
measures57. 
In any event, the suspension of the enforcement of a decision or ruling no 
longer holds where the court issues a judgment that concludes the procedure at 
fist instance (Article 61(6) PPSA). Where the judgment accepts the complaint, 
the court finds ‘whether and to what extent the contested act or activity cannot 
be performed’. This decision applies until the judgment becomes final (Article 
152 PPSA). 
Suspension of the enforcement of a decision is also possible at the stage 
of the procedure before the NSA in the case of a cassation complaint. This 
has recently been confirmed by the aforementioned resolution of the NSA 
of 16 April 2007 under which: “[f]or provisional protection to yield the 
desired result, it must be possible to apply it at any stage of the judicial and 
administrative procedure, including in the proceedings before the Supreme 
Administrative Court”. 
3.  Decisions that may be appealed
to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection
The decisions in cases for the designation of significant market power listed in 
Article 206(2) PT, for the imposition of regulatory obligations, for the imposition 
of penalties and decisions issued in disputes (except decisions on general 
exclusive frequency licences), may be appealed to the SOKiK58. This Court is 
part of the state court system in Poland and operates within the structures of the 
Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) in Warsaw. The proceedings before the SOKiK 
are governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (KPC); appeals 
against its judgments are heard by the Appellate Court in Warsaw. 
The possibility of filing an appeal with the SOKiK applies to situations, 
where the party is not entitled to use the means of appeal typical for the 
review of the functioning of central administrative authorities in Poland, 
such as an application for the re-examination of a case, or a complaint to the 
administrative court. The legislator has decided that the said decisions are 
enforceable immediately by virtue of law itself (Article 206(2a) PT). It means 
that in such cases Article 108 KPA or another special procedure does not 
apply, and the party is obliged to proceed with implementing the decision upon 
its delivery. However, the authority should inform the party of its immediate 
57 Cf. T. Woś [in:] Postępowanie sądowo administracyjne…, p. 220
58 As rightly pointed out by S. Piątek, these are any decisions issued in such cases, 
both positive and negative, annulling, changing, declaring invalidity. See. S. Piątek, Prawo 
telekomunikacyjne…, op.cit. p. 1122.
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enforceability by virtue of law in the content of the decision itself (Article 9, 
Article 11 and Article 107(3) KPA). 
The effect of the immediate enforceability of a decision by virtue of law 
is excluded, however, with respect to decisions on the imposition of financial 
penalties. Furthermore, in the case of penalties, the legislator excludes 
even the possibility of making the decision enforceable immediately by the 
authority pursuant to Article 108 KPA. Article 210(1) second sentence PT 
directly stipulates that “[t]he decision to impose a financial penalty shall not 
be enforceable immediately”. The foregoing means that where an appeal is 
filed with the SOKiK on the imposition of a financial penalty, such a decision 
will become enforceable only when the judgment of the court, provided it is 
unfavourable to the appellant, becomes final (Article 363 KPC). This usually 
means a situation where the SOKiK has dismissed the appeal of the punished 
entity, and the Appellate Court has subsequently dismissed the appeal against 
such a judgment of the SOKiK. 
The KPC gives the SOKiK the possibility to decide to suspend the 
enforcement of a challenged decision of the President of UKE until the case 
is resolved (Article 47963 KPC). This possibility undoubtedly applies also to 
decisions, which are enforceable immediately by virtue of law. Contrary to the 
concerns voiced in the legal literature59, suspending the enforcement of the 
latter decisions, the court does not change the provisions of the legal norm 
under Article 206(2a) PT. In such cases, the operation by the SOKiK has 
a clear legislative basis (Article 47963 KPC). In other words, even though the 
legislator considers the above decisions to be enforceable immediately by virtue 
of law, it provides, at the same time, for such enforceability to be suspended in 
specific cases if the competent court so decides. Additionally, the competence 
of the appeal body (in this case the SOKiK) to suspend the enforcement of 
a decision of the regulatory authority is expressly provided for in Article 4(1) 
of the Framework Directive. This means that Article 206(2a) PT may not be 
interpreted in a way that would be contrary to the said Community act. 
In cases for the suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the 
President of UKE, the SOKiK acts solely upon an application from a party. 
The possibility of filing an application has been closely linked to the filing of 
an appeal. An application may be filed only “[in] case of filing of an appeal…” 
(and hence, it would be inadmissible to file an application without appealing 
the contested decision of the regulatory authority), and only by the party 
that has filed the appeal (Article 47963 KPC). The request for suspending the 
decision of the President of UKE may be submitted to the SOKiK together 
with the appeal or after it is filed.60 By analogy to the proceedings before 
59 Cf. M. Rogalski, Zmiany w prawie…, pp. 250–251.
60 The SOKiK may hear an application on an in-camera session.
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the NSA, the additional creation of the possibility to file an application for 
suspending the enforcement of a regulatory decision at the stage of the appeal 
proceedings should be supported. This is dictated by reasons of effectiveness 
of judicial review of administration, taken into account by the NSA in its 
resolution of 16 April 2007, I GPS 1/07. 
Even though it does not follow directly from the provisions of the KPC, 
it should be concluded that an application to suspend the enforcement of 
a decision can be filed again if justified in the light of new circumstances. 
A change in circumstances may also lead to the modification, or annulment, 
of the ruling already issued, on suspending the enforcement of a decision61. 
The KPC does not set out the premises to be followed by the SOKiK 
adjudicating on an application for suspending the enforcement of a decision 
of the President of UKE. A view is expressed by the legal doctrine on this 
subject that it may be helpful to invoke the case law developed under Article 
108 KPA, seen a contrario, or the grounds for suspending the enforcement 
of a decision of the administrative court specified in Article 61(3) PPSA.62 
It seems that the latter solution is more correct. The procedural guarantees 
under both types of proceedings (i.e. before administrative court and SOKiK) 
should be approximated to the greatest degree possible. 
Hence the SOKiK should also consider whether in the case in question 
there is a risk of doing significant damage, or causing effects that may be 
difficult to reverse, whereas the ruling of the SOKiK should not be affected 
by the very issue of the defectiveness of the decision. 
What is of considerable importance for the effectiveness of court protection 
is, amongst other things, the time that elapses between the filing of the 
application for suspending the enforcement of a decision and the issuance of 
the judgment by the SOKiK. Too long a delay in hearing the application may 
make it pointless for the party, due to the prior full enforcement (voluntarily 
or through administrative enforcement) of the challenged decision. Hence, 
the SOKiK should aim to hear the application in as short a period of time 
as possible. By analogy to the application for securing a claim (Article 737 
KPC), the Court should act without delay, not later than within a week of the 
date it receives the application. This issue should be expressly defined in the 
provisions of the KPC on the proceedings before the SOKiK. 
61 Article 359 § 1 KPC stipulates that “Rulings which do not conclude the proceedings in 
the case may be annulled and changed as a result of a change in the circumstances of the case, 
even though they were challenged, and even final.” 
62 S. Gronowski, Ustawa antymonopolowa. Komentarz, Warszawa 1999, p. 302; I. Gabrysiak, 
“Upadek rygoru natychmiastowej wykonalności decyzji uchylonej nieprawomocnym wyrokiem 
SOKiK” (2008) 2 Prawo Teleinformatyczne 20.
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A judgment of the SOKiK that suspends the enforcement of the contested 
decision taken by the President of UKE is effective when pronounced, or when 
the conclusion thereof is signed (Article 360 KPC). However, the legislator does 
not require for the ruling to be provided with a statement of reasons (cf. Article 
357(1) and (2) KPC). This gap should also be filled through an intervention 
from the legislator (modelled on the solutions, which are in place in proceed-
ings before administrative courts). The foregoing is strictly connected with the 
necessity to create, in the Polish legal system, the possibility of appealing to the 
Appellate Court against judgments of the SOKiK on suspending the enforce-
ability of decisions taken by the President of UKE. The rules currently in place 
do not offer such a possibility, which considerably limits procedural guarantees 
of the appellant, and discriminates between the proceedings before the SOKiK 
and those before administrative courts, to the disadvantage of the former. 
Legal doctrine also considers the consequences of a non-final judgment 
by the SOKiK annulling the decision of the President of UKE for immediate 
enforceability of such a decision under Article 206(2a) PT. It is asserted that 
such a judgment (before it becomes final) should automatically result in the 
decision to which it pertains being deprived of the attribute of immediate 
enforceability63. This position does not seem convincing. Even though Article 
4(1) of the Framework Directive offers the possibility of suspending the 
enforcement of a decision of the national regulatory authority, nevertheless, 
the Directive reserves the competence to determine this matter for the appeal 
body. Hence, until the judgment by the SOKiK becomes final, the effect in 
the form of suspending the enforcement of the challenged decision cannot 
occur by virtue of law itself. One can only propose for the legislator to decide, 
also in this context, to amend the provisions of the KPC modelled on Article 
152 PPSA. Annulling a decision of the President of UKE, the SOKiK should 
therefore have a possibility to expressly decide whether and, if so, to what 
extent, a decision not yet finally annulled, may continue to be enforced. 
VI. Conclusions
The Polish legal system protects, in part, only the rights of telecommunications 
undertakings in connection with the enforcement of regulatory decisions on 
electronic communications. It is worth praising the administrative procedure 
rules concerning the proceedings held before the President of UKE, and the 
rules that govern the proceedings before administrative courts to the extent 
63 I. Gabrysiak, Upadek rygoru…, pp. 20–21.
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to which these courts are competent to hear appeals against decisions of the 
President of UKE. The only more significant suggestion de lege ferenda in 
this respect concerns the recognition of the full effectiveness of rulings of the 
regional administrative court (WSA) to suspend the enforcement of a decision 
of the regulatory authority.
The procedural guarantees relating to the suspension of the enforcement 
of decisions taken by the President of UKE by the SOKiK, on the other hand, 
should be viewed rather critically. Although the possibility of suspending the 
enforcement of such decisions also exists under the latter procedure, contrary 
to the aforementioned standards set out by the Council of Europe and the 
models taken from Community law, judgments of the SOKiK in such cases, 
do not require to be provided with a statement of reason and are not subject 
to review by the court of second instance. Neither does the law expressly 
set the premises to be followed by the court in such cases. This means 
that Polish law does not fully guarantee effective legal protection to Polish 
telecommunications undertakings, and by doing so, it limits their right of 
appeal referred to in Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive. This situation 
requires urgent legislative amendments, the closest model for which can be 
the rules concerning the proceedings before administrative courts. 
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